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Child Rapists live to see anotheR day
Shirley huang, esq.* 1
Introduction

Pre-Coker v. Georgia

eighteen states, the District of Columbia, and
The human capacity for good and compassion
makes the death penalty tragic; the human capacity for the federal government allowed the use of the death
evil and depraved behavior also makes the death penalty penalty for the rape of an adult woman in 1925.11 Almost fifty years later, that number had barely denecessary.2
Rape is “one of the most egregiously brutal acts creased.12 In Furman v. Georgia,13 the Court held that
one human being can inflict upon another,”3 and has the death penalty as imposed in the cases before the
been described as a “fate worse than death.”4 Child rape Court constituted cruel and unusual punishment. As a
is perhaps the worst crime one can commit, arguably result of the decision, states with capital rape statutes
second only to murder.5 It was not until the mid-1980s were forced to reconsider and revise their statutes so as
that the media brought child sexual abuse to the nation’s not to be arbitrary and capricious.14 Although states
began to reinstate the death penalty after Gregg v. Georattention as a serious issue.6
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided that sen- gia,15 only Georgia, north Carolina, and Louisiana
tencing a defendant to death for the crime of rape vio- maintained rape as a capital crime.16
lates the eighth Amendment because it constitutes
Coker v. Georgia
punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the crime
7
committed. For more than thirty
Child rape is perhaps the
In 1974 ehrlich Coker was
years, the constitutionality of classifying child rape as a capital crime worst crime one can com- sentenced to death after being conhas been questioned.8 The Court re- mit, arguably second only victed of the rape of a sixteen-yearold woman. Section 26-2001 of the
cently ended the ambiguity in
5
to
murder.
It
was
not
until
Georgia Criminal Code provided
Kennedy v. Louisiana by determinthe
mid-1980s
that
the
that
“(a) person convicted of rape
ing that the death penalty is an inappropriate sanction for child rapists, media brought child sexual shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life, or by imprisonwhere the victim is left alive.9
abuse to the nation’s atten- ment for not less than one nor more
This article explores the contion as a serious issue.6 than 20 years.”17 Defendant Coker
stitutionality of the death penalty for
argued that the state statute violated
the crime of child rape, focusing
10
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
specifically on Louisiana’s capital child rape statute.
Part II briefly outlines the Supreme Court’s child rape Amendment, and the Court agreed.18 Following the
decisions. Part III examines the practical and theoretical Coker decision, states followed suit and revised their
problems associated with using capital punishment in rape and death penalty statutes to reflect the holding.19
Between 1989 and 1995 no jurisdiction in the
the context of child rape. Part IV suggests ways to
amend child rape statutes to provide for the death united States authorized the death penalty as punishpenalty in a way that does not violate the eighth Amend- ment for the crime of rape.20 however, this changed in
1996 when Louisiana passed its capital rape statute and
ment.
sentenced Anthony Wilson and Patrick Bethley to death
Prepping the United States Supreme Court for Ju- for raping a child under the age of twelve.21 The
Louisiana capital rape statute made the death penalty a
dicial Review of Capital Punishment
potential punishment for aggravated rape of a child
for Child Rapists
under the age of thirteen.22
The Supreme Court Holds that Capital PunCapital Child Rape in Louisiana Courts
ishment in Cases Where the Victim is an Adult is
Unconstitutional
60
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State v. Wilson23 was the first case after Coker to
challenge a child rape statute. In 1995, Anthony Wilson
was indicted by a grand jury for aggravated rape of a
five year old girl.24 his case was consolidated with that
of Patrick Dewayne Bethley, who was charged with raping three girls under the age of ten, including his daughter.25 Defense counsel moved to quash the indictments
arguing that imposing the death penalty for the crime of
rape would constitute cruel and unusual punishment
under the eighth Amendment to the Constitution.26 The
trial courts in Wilson and Bethley’s cases agreed with
the defense on the grounds that the punishment was excessive and the class of eligible defendants had not been
sufficiently limited.27 The State appealed both cases to
the Louisiana Supreme Court which held that “in the
case of the rape of a child under the age of twelve, the
death penalty is not an excessive punishment nor is it
susceptible of being applied arbitrarily and capriciously.” 28 The united States Supreme Court denied
certiorari based on lack of jurisdiction because Bethley
had not been convicted or sentenced to death when the
challenges were made.29
Recently the Supreme Court reconsidered the
issue of capital punishment for child rapists in its decision in Kennedy. In 1998, Patrick Kennedy was charged
with aggravated rape of a victim under the age of
twelve: his eight-year-old stepdaughter.30 The State of
Louisiana sought the death penalty and the jury subsequently found the defendant guilty.31 In the penalty sentencing phase, the jury unanimously recommended a
death sentence.32
Was the Decision in Kennedy the Right One?

united States.
Is The Death Penalty Proportionate to The Crime
of Child Rape?
The Coker Court seemed to approach the death
penalty with the theory of “an eye for an eye,” finding
that the death penalty is appropriate for murder, but
not rape.38 Past decisions where the death penalty has
been sought in non-homicide cases have subsequently
been determined to be unconstitutional.39
Is the United States Evolving Towards Putting Child
Rapists To Death?
The concept of “[cruel and unusual] must draw
its meaning from evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.”40 Coker explored the issue of whether the “evolving standards of
decency” doctrine leads states which allow capital punishment to extend it to child rape cases that do not involve homicide. The Court stressed that the Louisiana
statute should be judged by “the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,”
and not the standards that existed when the eighth
Amendment was adopted.41 The Court concluded that
“there is a national consensus against capital punishment
for the crime of child rape.”42 In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court looked to objective factors such
as “public attitudes concerning a particular sentence history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing
decisions.”43
Legislative enactments

Could it merely have been a coincidence that the
more liberal justices made up the majority of the Coker
Court that found the Louisiana statute unconstitutional?33 Coker noted the importance of the Justices
looking beyond their own opinions to more objective
factors.34 Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal proclaimed
that the five liberal justices who voted the statute unconstitutional did “not share the same ‘standards of decency’ as the people of Louisiana.”35 naturally, Justices’
personal opinions will affect their judicial decisions.36
In Coker, dicta of the majority suggest a trend toward
abolishing the death penalty. 37 The Court’s decision in
Kennedy both embraces Coker’s instruction to look toward objective factors and appears to continue the trend
toward the outright abolition of the death penalty in the
Summer 2009

Since 1995, several states have attempted to pass
legislation providing the death penalty as a potential
sentence in child rape cases;44 few have been successful.45 In calculating the number of states with capital
rape statutes, the Court in Kennedy ignored states with
pending capital child rape legislation.46
Recent Supreme Court death penalty decisions
have looked to foreign countries in determining evolving standards of decency.47 Rape is punishable by death
in China, egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan,
uganda, united Arab emirates, and the former uSSR.48
China, Iran, Jordan, Mongolia, the Philippines, uganda,
61

and uzbekistan are the only foreign countries that utilize
the death penalty to punish child rapists.49 The more developed countries of the world are largely absent from
that list. Thus, although the Kennedy Court omitted any
discussion of international opinion,50 the result of the
case would likely have been the same; the death penalty
is excessive for the crime of child rape in developed
countries.
The Court thought it had rid its hands of the
issue of capital child rape in June 2008 with the Kennedy
decision, until an article in the new York Times51 noted
that on the weekend after the ruling, Marine Corps Reserve Colonel Dwight Sullivan wrote in a blog about the
Court’s failure to discuss the military penalty for rape
in the uniform Code of Military Justice.52 Once notified
of the omission, Louisiana petitioned the Court for a rehearing to consider the military capital child rape statute
enacted by Congress.53 On October 1, 2008, the Court
denied the state of Louisiana a rehearing on the matter.54
Acting Solicitor General Gregory Garre argued
that the actions by Congress and the President were “the
emerging ‘national consensus’ supporting - not opposing
- capital punishment in child rape cases.”55 In his opinion, Justice Kennedy seems to suggest that military law
has no place in the Court’s discussion of sentencing
civilians to death as the military world and civilian
world are two discrete spheres.56 however, in his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia questions how a soldier
could be sentenced to death for raping a child, yet a
civilian could not.57
In addition to questioning the distinction between military and civilian treatment of the death
penalty for child rape, Scalia also asserts that states that
categorically prohibit the death penalty should not be
counted when determining whether there is a national
consensus in favor of imposing the death penalty for a
certain crime.58 Fourteen states punish twenty-one different crimes with the death penalty.59 If the Court had
considered the non-homicide death penalty jurisdictions
along with the child rape death penalty jurisdictions,
Louisiana’s statute would have had a better chance of
surviving constitutional muster, as simply an additional
non-homicide death penalty law. On the other hand
even though those jurisdictions have such statutes they
have not been enforced,60 and thus the result may have
been the same.
history and Precedent
Since 1964, the united States has not executed
62

anyone for a crime that did not result in the death of the
victim.61 Kennedy notes that since 1964, only two individuals have been sentenced to death for child rape.62
In light of the Supreme Court holdings discussed above,
some prosecutors have chosen not to seek the death
penalty in child rape cases.63 For instance, in the case
of Rodolfo Lopez Velazquez, a convicted child rapist,
the prosecutor did not seek the death penalty because he
was under the impression that Coker controlled and that
the death penalty was unavailable as a sanction.64 however, when Coker struck down the death penalty as a
punishment for rape, the main rationale behind the ruling was that the survival of the victim does not justify
killing the rapist.65 Similarly, the Court stated in
Kennedy that “the death penalty can be disproportionate
to the crime itself where the crime did not result, or was
not intended to result, in the death of the victim.”66
That said, the Kennedy Court repeatedly noted the
following distinction: although Coker found that the
death penalty for raping an adult woman is unconstitutional, it did not necessarily exclude the death penalty
for child rape.67 Indeed, in his dissent Justice Samuel
Alito speculated as to why states do not pass laws making child rape a capital crime,68 whereas the majority
found it unnecessary to do so.69 The Court found that
in recent years some states have moved toward using
such a punishment; however, the change has been insignificant.70 The Court compared the forty-five jurisdictions that prohibit the death penalty for child rape to
“the 30 States in Atkins and Roper and the 42 States in
Enmund that prohibited the death penalty under the circumstances those cases considered.”71 In citing Atkins,
the Court recognizes that “[c]onsistent change [in support of the death penalty for rape] might counterbalance
an otherwise weak demonstration of consensus,”72 however, the Court found no such consistent change.73
Public Attitudes
Public attitudes toward imposition of the death
penalty are “an expression of society’s outrage at particularly offensive conduct.”74 Although states may be
increasingly tough on those who rape children,75 that
does not necessarily mean that the constituents of those
states approve of the death penalty for child rape. What
society thinks is acceptable can also be judged by the
response of juries.76 however, the mere fact that a jury
does not recommend a death sentence for a defendant
does not mean that the jury believes that the crime the
defendant committed should not be punishable by
Criminal Law Brief

death.77 Instead, juries reserve the death penalty for
those individuals they feel deserve it the most.78 In
doing so, jurors must evaluate the facts presented about
the defendant to determine “whether in this instance society is justified in killing him.”79

his victim.”90 Child rapists will therefore have to make
the conscious effort to kill their victim.91 By imposing
the death penalty on a child rapist, the courts will essentially be punishing the rapist for making the decision not
to kill the child.92 It sends a mixed message: “We will
kill you if you rape a child” and “Kill the child if you
Considering the Severity of the Death Penalty as a
wish because you will receive the death penalty either
Punishment for Child Rape
way.” Therefore, without the death penalty, child rapists
may be more inclined to kill the vicA punishment is excessive The existence of the death tim.
national Association of
and therefore unconstitutional under
penalty for child rape gives Social The
Workers (nASW), having
the eighth Amendment if it “(1)
makes no measurable contribution rapists no incentive to leave filed an amicus curiae brief in supto acceptable goals of punishment
their victims alive since port of Petitioner Patrick Kennedy,
believes that Louisiana’s aggravated
and hence is nothing more that the
they
could
easily
dispose
of
rape law undermines “the scourge of
purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering; or (2) is the best, and often the sole, sexual violence against children and
grossly out of proportion to the
aiding its victims”93 because “rather
witness to the crime.89
80
severity of the crime.” A punishthan protecting children, this statute
ment is also excessive when it “serves no penal purpose will increase the number of victimized children, encourmore effectively than a less severe punishment.”81 If a age offenders to kill their victims, and interfere with vicjuror believes that a death sentence is too severe and the tims’ healing process.”94
court is likely to impose such a sentence if the defendant
The death penalty is not necessary to achieve the
is found guilty, the juror may decide to vote to acquit in deterrent objective if a punishment less severe than
order to avoid the defendant’s execution.82
death will serve the same purpose.95 For example, the
possibility of receiving a sentence of life without parole
could be an effective deterrent.96 Advocated for criminal
Would the Death Penalty Deter Woulddefendants fear that guilty defendants will plead to the
Be Child Rapists?
charges simply to avoid the death penalty, while innoA sentence may be cruel and unusual punish- cent defendants will go to trial, “[risking] death to dement, even if it “may measurably serve the legitimate fend themselves at trial.”97 however with life without
ends of punishment.”83 however, a sentence is not in- parole as the alternative, this would not pose a serious
valid simply because it does not serve the legitimate problem because although the public may wish to have
ends of punishment.84 The majority in Kennedy points the defendant executed, he is removed from society, and
out that there is no significant proof that the death therefore he or she will no longer pose a threat to chilpenalty will deter individuals from committing child dren.
rape.85 There is no method to measure the number of
individuals who would be deterred from committing
Are Child Rapists Part of the “Most Deserving”
child rape by the potential imposition of the death
Capital punishment is reserved for “those ofpenalty.86 The death penalty could serve deterrent pur87
poses or it could have no effect at all. Some individu- fenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most seals are more prone to commit violent crimes than others, rious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes
“given the same objective motives and equal prospects them ‘the most deserving of execution.”98 The Supreme
of punishment.”88
Court in Coker v. Georgia, compared the impact of rape
The existence of the death penalty for child rape on a victim with the impact of murder on a victim. In
gives rapists no incentive to leave their victims alive doing so the Court concluded that the death penalty
since they could easily dispose of the best, and often the would violate the Constitution in child rape cases.99 The
sole, witness to the crime.89 The Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized that the life of a rape victim is not beCourt rejected Patrick Kennedy’s policy argument that yond repair.100 nevertheless, some commentators argue
upholding the statute will “encourage a rapist to murder otherwise. They note that while any existing physical
Summer 2009
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wounds may heal, the psychological effects of childhood sexual abuse will last a lifetime.101 Though rape
is not as final as murder, it is certainly an atrocious crime
that outrages society. In Kennedy v. Louisiana, Justice
Kennedy opines that questions of morality come into
play when considering banning the death penalty in
child rape cases.102 namely, he states that “there are
moral grounds to question a rule barring capital punishment for a crime against an individual that did not result
in death.”103 In determining whether child rapists are
the “most deserving,” Justice Alito implies that the majority in Kennedy misplaced its focus by considering the
eighth Amendment.104 he states that the amendment is
meant to protect an accused’s rights, not to determine
whether the punishment in question is “in the best interests of crime victims or the broader society.”105
Louisiana’s Capital Child Rape Statute As Written
Was Arbitrary and Capricious
A capital statute must distinguish between those
who deserve the death penalty and those who do not.106
A bright-line rule for the death penalty would not be rational in child rape cases.107 In Coker, Justice Powell
referenced Snider v. Peyton,108 which discusses the “degree of culpability of rapists.”109 he highlights that in
some cases, a rapist may be more vicious than a murderer,110 emphasizing the severe and aggravated nature
of rape.111
A death penalty statute may “not be imposed
under sentencing procedures that [create] a substantial
risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”112 There are certain standards that must
be met. First, the sentencing judge must have adequate
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to use as
guidelines.113 Second, the statute must sufficiently narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death
penalty.114 These standards can be met in two ways: (1)
the statute may narrow the definition of capital offenses
or, (2) the statute may broaden the definition of capital
offenses and narrow jury findings of aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase.115 The death penalty
may not be enforced infrequently such that the punishment becomes arbitrary.116
The two aggravating circumstances for the capital crime of child rape in Louisiana are the victim’s age
and the fact that the offense was rape or attempted
rape.117 The Court in Kennedy denied additional narrowing aggravators as a possible option to bring child
rape statutes within death penalty jurisprudence.118 Pres64

ident Barack Obama disagrees with the Court’s unwillingness to make an exception based on the brutality of
the attack.119 Obama believes that “if a state makes a
decision that under narrow, limited, well-defined circumstances, the death penalty is at least potentially applicable, that does not violate our Constitution.”120
Justice Roberts believes that the law was narrow enough
in limiting the availability of the death penalty to those
who rape victims under the age of twelve.121 In a separate opinion in Coker, Justice Powell suggests that the
death penalty would be proportionate for rape if the offense was “committed with excessive brutality or [if]…
the victim sustained serious or lasting injury.”122
On the Horizon: The Aftermath of Kennedy
The Court’s ruling in Kennedy v. Louisiana implied that no crime but murder should be punishable by
death. Although most would agree that the Coker and
Kennedy decisions outlaw the use of the death penalty
in child rape cases, others do not see the Kennedy decision as an end to the crusade.123 If proponents of the
death penalty for child rape do wish to continue the battle, they will have to help create statutes that will withstand the scrutiny of the Supreme Court. Proponents
can do so by adding aggravating and mitigating circumstances and developing techniques to help reduce or
even eliminate innocent executions.
South Carolina recently passed a statute providing that first-time child rapist is not eligible for the death
penalty.124 If the united States Supreme Court were to
review South Carolina’s statute prior to the Kennedy
case, the Court could very well have held that the statute
is constitutional because it is tailored to avoid the substantial risk of imposing the death penalty arbitrarily and
capriciously.125
Aggravating Circumstances State Legislatures
Should Consider
The extremely broad Louisiana child rape statute
had no provisions for requirements such as corroboration or prior convictions of sexual assault.
Rapist is Carrying a Life Threatening Disease
Faced with hIV-positive defendants and defendants with AIDS, would opponents of the death penalty
for the crime of child rape view death as disproportionate to the crime if the child contracts the fatal disease
Criminal Law Brief

from the rapist? Although the death may not be imme- actions and his or her victim nevertheless deserves jusdiate, the rapist will undoubtedly be the proximate cause tice.
of the eventual death of the child.126 Louisiana does not
allow the death penalty under a felony-murder theory,127
The Rapist is a Family Member
but it would be interesting to see if it would accept the
hIV-positive status of a defendant as an aggravating cirWhen it comes to juvenile victims, over thirtycumstance rising to the level of felony-murder.128
four percent of individuals who rape children are family
members of those children, and approximately fifty-nine
percent are acquaintances.135 Allowing the death penalty
Prior Record of Conviction of Sexual Offense
for child rape may make already reluctant children less
Capital punishment could potentially deter oth- likely to report sexual assaults.136 even if a child does
ers from committing rapes after being convicted the first report the assault, the child may be easily persuaded to
time.129 Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion recant the allegation by family members.137 Opponents
in Coker called attention to the fact that the defendant argue that imposing a rape sentence on a child rapist that
was already serving a lengthy prison sentence.130 Addi- is related to the victim by blood or marriage, would be
tional prison time would have “no incremental punitive “undeniably counterproductive and will not serve any
effect” because Coker has a life pattern such that he legitimate penal purpose for the State of Louisiana.”138
“presents a particular danger to the safety, welfare, and
Protecting the Innocent
chastity of women . . . [such that] the likelihood is therefore great that he will repeat his crime at the first opportunity.”131 Thus, in theory, capital punishment would
One reason that juries generally may decide not
have a deterrent force on the habitual offender because to impose the death penalty is a lack of irrefutable
once convicted, he would have no other opportunity to guilt.139 There is a need for heightened reliability in capcommit rape.
ital cases “to guard against the risk that an innocent defendant might be put to death.”140 The testimony of
Mitigating Circumstances Legislatures Should
children may be unreliable because they are susceptible
Consider
to suggestion,141 may confuse fantasy with reality,142 and
often recant their allegations.143
The national Association of Criminal Defense
A Mental Disease/Illness
Lawyers (nACDL), as amici curiae in Kennedy v.
Should we punish a person by death if he or she Louisiana, stresses the lack of reliability of children as
is committing child rape because of a mental illness? witnesses because of factors such as their vulnerability
Several states provide for involuntary civil commitment to suggestion and the withdrawal of their allegations.144
of sexually violent predators whereby the State confines Although this is a valid point to consider, it should not
individuals who are determined to be a threat to society be given much weight because juries also undoubtedly
if they are released after imprisonment.132 If the condi- weigh the credibility of the testifying child victim
tion is treatable or curable, should we treat those defen- against the accused.145 Children may be unable to disdants like the mentally incompetent and stay the tinguish between imagination and reality,146 and this
weakness leaves these young witnesses vulnerable to atexecution until they regain competency?
tacks on their credibility. As much as juries would like
to believe children, they tend not to lend credence to
Prior Victimization
children over adults,147 despite the fact that the alleged
Many sexual assault offenders were sexual as- sex offender has the most to gain by falsifying his or her
sault victims prior to offending.133 Offenders who have testimony. In Kennedy, Justice Alito addressed the relia history of being sexually abused as a child have a ability concerns regarding child witnesses and suggests
lower degree of culpability as they do not always realize a corroboration requirement supported by precedent.148
the impropriety of sexual misconduct.134 Being a past
victim of sexual abuse, though mitigating, would not
Innocence Review Commission
constitute absolute protection from prosecution. The
As with any person charged with a crime, there
victim-turned-offender is still responsible for his or her
Summer 2009
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is always a possibility that the person is innocent.149 Society relies on juries to find guilt correctly in capital
cases so as not to execute an innocent person.150 In order
to decrease the likelihood of executing an innocent person, states may adopt an innocence review commission
similar to north Carolina’s review commission.151 however, the existence of an innocence review commission
may cause jurors to use a standard lower than beyond a
reasonable doubt because they believe the commission
will catch their mistakes.152
Conclusion
The death penalty has the potential to be proportionate for child rape in the manner for which Louisiana
provides. If a state chooses to rebel against the Kennedy
ruling and pass a capital child rape statute, then the
statute must be narrowed such that only those who truly
deserve it will receive the death penalty.153
The Court’s decision in Kennedy begs the question: if the death penalty is not acceptable for any type
of rape—which is a crime against a person—then is
there any justification for sentencing someone to death
for a crime against the State? Because child rape is
often viewed as second to murder as the most heinous
crime,154 The Kennedy decision could be used by defense counsels to argue that their clients should not be
executed for a non-homicide crime. unless states start
passing legislation capitalizing non-homicide crimes
and sentencing to death defendants who did not kill anyone, such statutes will suffer the same fate as the one
that originally sentenced Patrick Kennedy to the death
penalty. The Supreme Court would then be forced to
announce clearly that only murderers will be executed
and create another landmark case in death penalty jurisprudence.
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school. Lastly, the author wishes to thank the staff of the Criminal Law Brief for all of the hours they invested into preparing the
article for publication.
2
FRAnK G. CARRInGTOn, neITheR CRueL nOR unuSuAL: The
CASe FOR CAPITAL PunIShMenT 11 (Arlington house 1978)
(quoting Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of the State of
Florida).
3
Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 u.S. 584, 607-08 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
1

66

Melissa Meister, Murdering Innocence: The Constitutionality of
Capital Child Rape Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. ReV. 197 (2003) (quoting MARCIA J. WALKeR & STAnLeY L. BRODSKY, SeXuAL ASSAuLT: The VICTIM AnD The RAPIST 135 (1976)).
5
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008) (“Petitioner’s crime was one that cannot be recounted in these pages in
a way sufficient to capture in full the hurt and horror inflicted on
his victim or to convey the revulsion society . . . sought to express.”).
6
Bridgette M. Palmer, note, Death as a Proportionate Penalty
for the Rape of a Child: Considering One State’s Current Law, 15
GA. ST. u. L. ReV. 843, 844 (1999) (citing DOuGLAS W. PRYOR,
unSPeAKABLe ACTS: WhY Men SeXuALLY ABuSe ChILDRen ix
(1996)); see also Childhelp.org, national Child Abuse Statistics,
http://www.childhelp.org/resources/learning-center/statistics (last
visited nov. 5, 2008) (compiling data from the national Institute
on Drug Abuse 2000 Report and a Child Abuse & neglect Study
conducted by Arthur Becker-Weidman PhD and finding that
“children who have been sexually abused are 2.5 times more
likely to abuse alcohol and 3.8 times more likely to become addicted to drugs”).
4

See Coker, 433 u.S. 584; see also u.S. COnST. amend. VIII.
8
See discussion infra Part II (discussing the history of the
Supreme Court’s treatment of capital punishment for rape).
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650-51 (2008) (holding that “a death
sentence for one who raped but did not kill a child, and who did
not intend to assist another in killing the child, is unconstitutional
under the eighth and Fourteenth Amendments”).
10
See LA. ReV. STAT. Ann. tit. 14 § 42(D) (West 2007), invalidated by Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
11
Coker, 433 u.S. at 593.
12
Id. (remarking that sixteen states and the federal government
still authorized capital punishment for the rape of adult women).
13
408 u.S. 238 (1972).
14
Coker, 433 u.S. at 594.
15
428 u.S. 153, 169 (1976) (holding that the punishment of death
for the crime of murder does not “invariably violate the Constitution”); see also Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DuKe
L.J. 1, 8-9 (2007) (“Gregg is the 1976 landmark that reinstated
the death penalty a mere four years later, approving newly drafted
‘guided discretion’ statutes and inaugurating what has come to be
known as the modern death penalty era.”) (citing Gregg, 428 u.S.
at 195).
16
Coker, 433 u.S. at 594 (finding Louisiana and north Carolina’s
statutes made the death penalty mandatory in rape cases and were
therefore subsequently invalidated by Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
u.S. 325 (1976) and Woodson v. north Carolina, 428 u.S. 280
(1976)). Aggravated rape was punishable by death in Louisiana
until 1976 when it was determined by the united States Supreme
Court to “constitute[] cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Selman v.
Louisiana, 428 u.S. 906 (1976), remanded to 340 So. 2d 260 (La.
1976) (“[T]he appropriate sentence to be imposed upon a valid
conviction for aggravated rape is the most severe constitutional
penalty established by the legislature for a lesser included offense
at the time the crime was committed . . . [which is] twenty years
at hard labor.”).
17
GA. CRIM. CODe § 26-2001 (1971 rev.).
9

Criminal Law Brief

Coker, 433 u.S. at 592 (concluding that a death sentence is a
“grossly disproportionate” punishment for the crime of rape).
19
David W. Schaaf, note, What If The Victim Is A Child? Examining The Constitutionality Of Louisiana’s Challenge To Coker v.
Georgia, 2000 u. ILL. L. ReV. 347, 354-55 (noting that Tennessee and Florida each struck down their respective capital child
rape statute after applying the Coker rationale); see also Collins
v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tenn. 1977) (striking down Tennessee’s capital child rape statute); Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d
943, 951 (Fla. 1981) (striking down Florida’s capital child rape
statute).
20
Pamela J. Lormand, Proportionate Sentencing for Rape of a
Minor: The Death Penalty Dilemma, 73 TuL. L. ReV. 981, 1014
(1999).
18

See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996).
See LA. ReV. STAT. Ann. tit. 14 § 42(D) (West 2007) (“Whoever
commits the crime of aggravated rape shall be punished by life
imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation,
or suspension of sentence. (2) however, if the victim was under
the age of thirteen years . . . : (a) And if the district attorney
seeks a capital verdict, the offender shall be punished by death or
life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, in accordance with the determination of the jury . . . .”), invalidated by Kennedy v. Louisiana,
128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
23
685 So. 2d 1063 (consolidating Bethley’s case with Wilson’s).
24
Id. at 1064.
25
Id. at 1065. Bethley also knew that he was hIV positive at the
time of the rapes. Id.
26
Id. at 1064-65 (“The thrust of both defendants’ arguments is
that the imposition of the death penalty for a crime not resulting
in a death is ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ and therefore unconstitutional under the eight [sic] Amendment to the united States
Constitution . . . .”); see also u.S. COnST. amend. VIII.
27
Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1065.
28
Id. at 1063, 1073.
29
See Betheley v. Lousiana, 520 u.S. 1259 (1997) (finding that in
cases involving a criminal defendant “finality is normally defined
by the imposition of the sentence” (quoting Flynt v. Ohio, 451
u.S. 619, 620 (1981)). For more on the Bethley case see generally Rhonda Bell, Rape Suspect Ot [sic] Ready For Trial Mentally Retarded Man Faces Death If Convicted Of Rape Of
6-Year-Old, neW ORLeAnS TIMeS-PICAYune, Dec. 16, 1999, at
B1. As of 1999, Wilson was determined mentally retarded and incompetent to stand trial. Id. Bethley pled guilty and received a
life sentence for a single count of aggravated rape to avoid prosecutors seeking the death penalty. Id. Prosecutors predicted Bethley would not live through the automatic appeals process if he
was given the death sentence because he was hIV positive. Id.
30
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2645-46 (describing the victim’s injuries
as extremely severe).
31
Id. at 2646.
32
State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757, 761 (La. 2007).
33
See Paula Berg, Toward A First Amendment Theory Of DoctorPatient Discourse And The Right To Receive Unbiased Medical
Advice, 74 B.u. L. ReV. 201 (1994) (characterizing the Burger
Court, which decided Coker, as quite “liberal”).
34
Coker, 433 u.S. at 592 (noting that the Court should specifi21
22

Summer 2009

cally consider “public attitudes concerning a particular sentence
history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of
juries reflected in their sentencing decisions.”); see also discussion infra Part III.A.
35
Mark Sherman, Court Bans Death Penalty for Child Rape, ASSOCIATeD PReSS STATe & LOCAL WIRe, June 26, 2008.
36
Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Socio-Legal Methodology For The Internal/External Distinction: Jurisprudential Implications, 75 FORDhAM L. ReV. 1255, 1256 (2006) (“Justices in some instances
consciously decide cases on political grounds, regardless of what
they say, and all Justices subconsciously see the law through the
lens of their ideological beliefs, which shape their legal interpretations.”).
37
See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650 (observing that, by providing
for capital punishment, the law risks running counter to the constraints of the Constitution).
38
See Coker, 433 u.S. at 598 (“[T]he death penalty . . . is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human
life.”).
39
See, e.g., enmund v. Florida, 458 u.S. 782 (1982) (holding that
sentencing to death a defendant who aids and abets a felony in
which murder is committed by others violates the eighth Amendment); eberheart v. Georgia, 433 u.S. 917 (1977) (concluding
that imposing the death penalty for aggravated kidnapping is
cruel and unusual); united States v. Jackson, 390 u.S. 570 (1968)
(finding the Federal Kidnapping Act to be unconstitutional because of a capital punishment clause).
40
Trop v. Dulles, 356 u.S. 86, 101 (1958).
41
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649 (quoting Trop, 356 u.S. at 101).
42
Id. at 2657-58. The Louisiana Supreme Court, on the other
hand, disagreed by considering the number of jurisdictions which
have capital non-homicide crimes and therefore, concluded that
there is no national consensus as the use of capital punishment
for crimes that do not result in the death of the victim. 957 So.
2d 757, 788 (La. 2007), overruled by Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641.
43
See e.g., Coker, 433 u.S. at 592 (singling out legislative enactments and jury responses as the only relevant factors); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 u.S. 361, 379 (1989) (citing plurality opinion as
an important factor), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 u.S.
551 (2005).
44
See Colin Garrett, Death Watch, ChAMPIOn, June 2006, at 46
(finding Massachusetts, California, Pennsylvania, Virginia and
Alabama have all considered bills).
45
See TeX. Pen. CODe § 12.42 (2007 Supp.); FLA. STAT. Ann. §
794.011(2)(a) (West 2000); 10 OKL. ST. Ann. § 7115(I) (2006
Supp); S.C. CODe Ann. § 16-3-655(C)(I) (2006 Supp).
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2656 (“It is not our practice, nor is it
sound, to find contemporary norms based upon state legislation
that has been proposed but not yet enacted.”).
47
See Roper, 543 u.S. at 578 (noting that international opinion is
largely opposed to the use of the death penalty for juvenile defendants). however, Roper also makes it clear that international
opinion is not determinative. Id.
48
ROGeR hOOD, The DeATh PenALTY: A WORLD-WIDe PeRSPeCTIVe 77 (3d ed. 2002).
49
Joanna h. D’Avella, note, Death Row for Child Rape? Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Under the Roper-Atkins “Evolving
Standards of Decency” Framework, 92 CORneLL L. ReV. 129,
154 (2006) (citing hOOD, supra note 48, at 84-85).
46

67

Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (failing to discuss international standards); see also Landon Webber, Victims Ignored and Justice Denied, Because of Supreme Court’s ‘Evolving Standards,’ WRITe
IDeA, June 27, 2008, http://www.writeidea.org/2008/06/victimsignored-and-justice-denied.html (“In Wednesday’s decision,
Kennedy v. Louisiana, Justice Kennedy at least decided to stick
with determining national consensus based on the laws of u.S.
states.”).
50

Col. Dwight Sullivan, The Supremes Dis the Military Justice
System, CAAFLOG, June 28, 2008,
http://caaflog.blogspot.com/2008/06/supremes-dis-military-justice-system.html.
52
10 u.S.C. §§ 856, 920; Manual for Courts-Martial, united
States, Part IV, ¶ 45.f(1) (2008).
53
Section 552(b) of the national Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006, 119 Stat. 3136, 3264 (2006).
51

See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
Warren Richey, Despite Gaffe, Supreme Court Won’t Revisit
Landmark Child-Rape Ruling, ChRISTIAn SCIenCe MOnITOR, Oct.
2, 2008, at 25.
56
See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1, at *2 (2008) (statement denying petition for rehearing) (“In any event, authorization of the death
penalty in the military sphere does not indicate that the penalty is
constitutional in the civilian context.”).
57
Id. at *3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58
LInDA e. CARTeR & eLLen KReITZBeRG, unDeRSTAnDInG CAPITAL PunIShMenT LAW 79 (2004).
59
Matthew Silversten, Comment, Sentencing Coker v. Georgia to
Death: Capital Child Rape Statutes Provide the Supreme Court
an Opportunity to Return Meaning to the Eighth Amendment, 37
GOnZ. L. ReV. 121, 162 n.339 (2002).
60
See infra Part III.A.1.b.
61
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct.
2641 (2008) (no. 07-34), 2007 WL 2688267, at *11 n.2 (noting
that James Coburn was executed for robbery (citing eXeCuTIOnS
In The u.S. 1608-2002: The ePSY FILe eXeCuTIOnS BY DATe 381
(2007))). In 2003, Brin Regan, a former u.S. Air Force sergeant
was convicted of two counts of attempted espionage, but the jury
did not find him eligible for the death penalty under the Federal
Death Penalty Act. CARTeR & KReITZBeRG, supra note 58,
at 90-91.
62
Patrick Kennedy and Richard Davis also happen to be the only
individuals on death row in the united States for a non-homicide
crime. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2657.
63
Divided Court Says Rape Convict Can’t Receive Life Without
Parole, ASSOCIATeD PReSS STATe & LOCAL WIRe, Feb. 25, 2008.
54
55

Id. The Georgia Supreme Court refused to accept the State’s argument and upheld the Court of Appeals decision that the trial
judge did not have the authority to sentence the defendant to life
without parole without first seeking the death penalty. Id.
65
See Coker, 433 u.S. at 598 (“We have the abiding conviction
that the death penalty, which ‘is unique in its severity and irrevocability,’ is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does
not take human life.” (quoting Gregg, 428 u.S. at 187)).
66
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650; see also Coker, 433 u.S. at 599;
emily Marie Moeller, Comment, Devolving Standards of Decency: Using the Death Penalty to Punish Child Rapists, 102
64

68

DICK. L. ReV. 621, 648 998) (“Because the death penalty is the
ultimate sanction our criminal justice system provides, it should
be reserved for those whose crime involves the unjustified taking
of a human life, not child rape.”). The Court chose not to address
the death penalty for crimes against the State such as treason or
terrorism. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659.
67
See id. at 2654-56.
68
See id. at 2668 (Alito, J., dissenting) (mentioning reasons such
as respecting the Coker decision and fear of wasting state resources if their statute is found unconstitutional). In the Coker
dissent, Chief Justice Burger suggested that other states may be
inclined to adopt the death penalty if they see a strong decrease in
Georgia’s incidence of rape. Coker, 433 u.S. at 618 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
69
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2655 (“In the absence of evidence from
those States where legislation has been proposed but not enacted
we refuse to speculate about the motivations and concerns of particular state legislators.”).
70
See id. at 2656.
71
Id. at 2653.
72
Id. at 2656.
73
Id.
74
Gregg, 428 u.S. at 183. One public poll revealed that sixtyfive percent of those surveyed were in favor of executing child
molesters. Corey Rayburn, Better Dead Than Raped?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital Rape Statutes, 78 ST. JOhn’S
L. ReV. 1119, 1138 (2004) (citing John Q. Barrett, Death for
Child Rapists May Not Save Children, nAT’L L.J., Aug. 18, 1997,
at A21).
75
Mark Sherman, US Supreme Court Reviewing Death Penalty
For Child Rapists, ASSOCIATeD PReSS WORLDSTReAM, Apr. 16,
2008.
Darrel K. harris was convicted of “brutally murdering the three
people in a Brooklyn social club in the first capital trial since the
death penalty returned to new York.” ROBeRT JAY LIFTOn &
GReG MITCheLL, WhO OWnS DeATh? CAPITAL PunIShMenT, The
AMeRICAn COnSCIenCe, AnD The enD OF The DeATh PenALTY 143
(2000). Most of the panel was disgusted by these murders, but
two jurors “held out for a life sentence, believing the man could
be spiritually redeemed in prison.” Id. at 144.
77
See Gregg, 428 u.S. at 182 (“The relative infrequency of jury
verdicts imposing the death sentence does not indicate rejection
of capital punishment per se.”).
78
See id. (“Rather, the reluctance of juries in many cases to impose the sentence may well reflect the humane feeling that this
most irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme cases.”).
79
LIFTOn & MITCheLL, supra note 76, at 139 (referring to murderers).
80
Coker, 433 u.S. at 592 (citing Gregg, 428 u.S. 153 (1976)).
81
Furman, 408 u.S. at 279-80 (Brennan, J., concurring).
82
See Brief Amici Curiae of the ACLu et al., Coker v. Georgia,
433 u.S. 584 (1977) (no. 75-5444), 1976 WL 181482, at *28 n.*
(noting that “the threatened penalty may come to dominate the
deliberation of a jury” (quoting hARRY KALVen, JR. & hAnS
ZeISeL, The AMeRICAn JuRY 311 n.8 (1966))).
83
Coker, 433 u.S. at 593 n.4.
84
Id.
85
See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2655 (“Respondent cites no reliable
76

Criminal Law Brief

data to indicate that state legislatures have read Coker to bar capital punishment for child rape and, for this reason, have been deterred from passing applicable death penalty legislation.”).
86
Ken Vernon, Reflecting Society, GOLD COAST BuLL., nov. 21,
2005, at 37 (quoting poet hyman Barshay)
The death penalty is a warning, just like a lighthouse throwing its beams out to sea. We hear
about shipwrecks, but we do not hear about the
ships the lighthouse guides safely on their way.
We do not have proof of the number of ships it
saves, but we do not tear the lighthouse down.
Id.
87
Coker, 433 u.S. at 617 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88
hOOD, supra note 48, at 205 (quoting Isaac ehrlich, Capital
Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. eCOn. 714, 742-43 (1977)).
89
Yale Glazer, Child Rapists Beware! The Death Penalty and
Louisiana’s Amended Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 79, 105 (1997) (citing Original Brief of Appellee Patrick Dewayne Bethley at 20, State v. Bethley, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La.
1996) (no. 96-F0-460)); see also Brief of the national Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (nACDL) as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Patrick Kennedy v. Louisiana, 2007 WL
4104371 at *3 (nov. 14, 2007) (no. 07-343) (“Child sexual abuse
convictions are often ‘based primarily, if not solely, on the word
of the victims involved.’” (quoting Dana A. Anderson, Assessing
the Reliability of Child Testimony in Sexual Abuse Cases, 69 S.
CAL. L. ReV. 2117, 2118 (1996))).
90
State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d at 789 n.38.
91
Glazer, supra note 89, at 106.
92
Id. at 107 (“Those who oppose the imposition of the death
penalty for the rape of a child under twelve argue that if the defendant did not intend to kill the victim, the defendant should not
be punished as if such an intent existed.”).
93
Brief of the national Association of Social Workers (nASW) et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008) (no. 07-343), 2007 WL 3444963
(nov. 14, 2007).
94
Id. at *3 (showing an estimated number of 83,000 to 217,000
children a year are sexual abuse victims); id. at *6 (citing u.S.
Department of health and human Services, Child Maltreatment
2005 41 tbl. 3-6 (2007)); Andrea J. Sedlak & Diane D. Broadhurst, Third National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect
2-1 to -3, 3-3 tbl.3-1 (1996).
95
CARTeR & KReITZBeRG, supra note 58, at 8 (comparing
the use and non-use of the death penalty among states).
96
Furman, 408 u.S. at 356 (Marshall, J. concurring) (“Life imprisonment remains a severe sanction which can be used as leverage for bargaining for pleas or confessions in exchange either for
charges of lesser offenses or recommendations of leniency.”).
97
Brief of the nACDL, supra note 89, at *10 (citing Joseph L.
hoffmann et al., Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Death, 69
FORDhAM L. ReV. 2313, 2359 (2001)); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 61, at *22 (“[D]efendants charged with child
rape are more likely to plead guilty than before [Louisiana’s capital rape law] was enacted.” (citing Angela D. West, Death as Deterrent or Prosecutorial Tool? Examining the Impact of
Louisiana’s Child Rape Law, 13 CRIM. JuST. POL’Y ReV. 156
(2002))).
98
See Roper, 543 u.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins, 536 u.S. 304, 319

Summer 2009

(2002) (presenting recent case law discussing evolving standards
of decency in response to national concerns about the use of capital punishment).
99
Coker, 433 u.S. at 598 (“Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it
was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair.”).
100
Id.
Glazer, supra note 89, at 86 (explaining that rape victims suffer behavioral problems long after their physical injuries have
healed); see also Brief of nASW, supra note 93, at *11 (showing
that “[sexual] abuse increases the likelihood that the victim will
subsequently engage in crime, become pregnant while a minor,
drop out of school, abuse alcohol or drugs, and suffer from psychological disorders, such as depression, anxiety disorders, and
posttraumatic stress disorder.” (citing BARBARA TATeM KeLLY,
u.S. DePARTMenT OF JuSTICe, In The WAKe OF ChILDhOOD MALTReATMenT 2 (Aug. 1997))).
102
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2658.
101

Id. See also id. at 2649 (pointing out that “[t]he standard of
extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment”) (quoting Furman, 408 u.S. at 382
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
104
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2673 (Alito, J., dissenting).
103

Id.
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the united States
Supreme Court in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 u.S. 231 (1988)
held “a death sentence does not violate the eighth Amendment
merely because the single statutory ‘aggravating circumstance’
found by the jury duplicates an element of the underlying offense.” Kennedy, 957 So. 2d at 791.
107
Justice Powell does not believe that it is so simple to have a
bright-line-rule. Coker, 433 u.S. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
108
356 F.2d 626, 627 (4th Cir. 1966).
109
Coker, 433 u.S. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Snider, 356 F.2d at 627 (“There is extreme
variation in the degree of culpability of rapists. If one were sentenced to death upon conviction of rape of an adult under circumstances lacking great aggravation, the Supreme Court might well
find it an appropriate case to consider the constitutional question
tendered to us.”)).
110
Id.
111
Id. (“Some victims are so grievously injured physically or psychologically that life is beyond repair.”).
112
Gregg, 428 u.S. at 188 (referring to the holding of Furman).
113
Lormand, supra note 20, at 987 (citing Gregg, 428 u.S. at
188); see also Woodson, 428 u.S. 280 (requiring statutes to have
some mitigating circumstances in order to avoid being determined an arbitrary and capricious punishment).
114
Lormand, supra note 20, at 988 (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462
u.S. 862, 877 (1983)).
115
Id. at 987 (citing Lowenfield, 484 u.S. at 246). Louisiana has
decided to narrowly define its capital offenses, thereby allowing
the jury to narrow its findings at the guilt phase. See Brief in Op(“[T]he
disposition to Petition for Certiorari, Kennedy v.curring)
Louisiana,
29 S.Ct.
1, (2008) (no. 07-343), 2007 WL 4104370, at *23.
116
Furman, 408 u.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., con
105
106

69

cretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables
the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against
the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout,
or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more protected position.”).
117
Louisiana requires that a jury find “beyond a reasonable doubt
that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists” before
sentencing a defendant to death. LA. CODe CRIM. PROC. Ann. art.
905.3, 905.4 (West 1997).
118
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660 (denying the utility of more aggravating circumstances such as to authorize capitalizing child
rape because it would still result in arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty).
119
See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Bar Death Penalty for the
Rape of a Child, n.Y. TIMeS, A1, June 21, 2008 (noting that President Obama disagrees with the Court’s unwillingness to make an
exception based on the brutality of the attack).
120
See Robert Barnes, High Court Rejects Death for Child Rape,
WASh. POST, A1, June 26, 2008.
121
Bill Walsh, Justices Consider Death Penalty for Child Rapists,
neWhOuSe neWS SeRVICe, Apr. 16, 2008.
122
See Coker, 433 u.S. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
123
Texas Representative Lamar Smith proposed an amendment to
the u.S. Constitution to overrule the Kennedy decision. Rep.
Smith Introduces Constitutional Amendment to Protect Child Victims of Forcible Rape, uS FeD neWS, June 26, 2008. The resolution does not mandate the death penalty, but it certainly makes
the option available for the justice system. Id.
124
S.C. CODe Ann. § 16-3-655(C)(I) (2006 Supp); Garrett, supra
note 44.
125
For an in-depth discussion of South Carolina’s capital child
rape statute, see Carli J. Wilcox, Is South Carolina’s New Capital
Child Rape Statute Unconstitutional as Cruel and Unusual Under
the Eighth Amendment?, 1 ChARLeSTOn L. ReV. 315 (2007).
126
See People v. Dekens, 695 n.e.2d 474, 475 (Ill. 1998) (“under
[the proximate cause] theory, liability attaches ‘for any death
proximately resulting from the unlawful activity-notwithstanding
the fact that the killing was by one resisting the crime.’” (quoting
People v. Lowery, 687 n.e.2d 973, 975-76 (1997))); see also
People v. Boand, 838 n.e.2d 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (applying
the proximate cause theory of liability to a rape case).
127
See LA. CODe CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 905.
128
Angelyn L. Miller, Comment, Constitutional Law: Can a
Convicted Rapist Be Sentenced to Death for Raping a Child
Under Twelve Years of Age?, 37 WAShBuRn L.J. 187, 202 (1997))
(suggesting that the death penalty should be offered only when
the rapist not only has AIDS, but is also aware of having AIDS).
129
See Coker, 433 u.S. at 665-66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(“[O]thers in his position will henceforth feel no compunction
whatsoever about committing further rapes as frequently as he
may be able to escape from confinement and indeed even within
the walls of the prison itself.”).
130
On September 2, 1974, Coker escaped from the Ware Correctional Institution after which he entered the house of Allen and
elnita Carver and raped Mrs. Carver. Id. at 587.
131
Id. at 606-07 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

70

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. Ann. §§ 394.910-.930 (West 2008).
nATIOnAL CenTeR FOR JuVenILe JuSTICe, SeXuAL ASSAuLT OF
YOunG ChILDRen AS RePORTeD TO LAW enFORCeMenT: VICTIM,
InCIDenT, AnD OFFenDeR, ChARACTeRISTICS (2000),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf (citing Vanderbilt, 1992) (last visited nov. 5, 2008).
134
See Suzanne Meiners-Levy, Challenging the Prosecution of
Young “Sex Offenders”: How Developmental Psychology and the
Lessons of Roper Should Inform Daily Practice, 79 TeMP. L. ReV.
499, 507 (2006) (“[A]s prior victims of abuse, they are less likely
to realize the inappropriateness or illegality of their sexual behavior.”) (citing Larry K. Brown et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on
the HIV-Risk-Related Behavior of Adolescents in Intensive Psychiatric Treatment, 157 AM. J. PSYChIATRY 1413, 1414-15
(2000))).
135
national Center for Juvenile Justice, Sexual Assault of Young
Children as Reported to Law Enforcement: Victim, Incident, and
Offender, Characteristics, 2000,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf (last visited
nov. 5, 2008).
136
William G. Austin, Assessing Credibility in Allegations of
Marital Violence in the High-Conflict Child Custody Case, 38
FAM. & COnCILIATIOn COuRTS ReV. 462, 468 (2000) (“Sometimes
the children will report on incidents, but they may be reluctant to
report because of a loyalty conflict in their attachment to the parents or being aligned with a parent who is a perpetrator of
abuse.”); Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children’s Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 CORneLL L. ReV. 1004, 1048
(1999) (remarking that some children do report abuse out of fear
of what may to them, their families or their perpetrators). In
some cases, the child is even more unlikely to report abuse because the abuser is a family member otherwise close to the child,
and additionally, children sometimes are afraid of being blamed
for what has happened to them. Id.; see also Brief of the nASW,
supra note 93, at *8 (finding that there is a high rate of reluctance
of children to report sexual abuse by family members) (citing
Tina B. Goodman-Brown et al., Why Children Tell: A Model of
Children’s Disclosure of Sexual Abuse, 27 ChILD ABuSe &
neGLeCT 525, 537 (2003)).
137
See Brief of nACDL, supra note 89, at *6 (citing Lindsay
Malloy et al., Filial Dependency & Recantation of Child Sexual
Abuse Allegations, 46 J. AM. ACAD. ChILD & ADOLeSC. PSYChIATRY 162, 167 (Feb. 2007)); see also infra Part IV.e (expressing
concerns about the use of child testimony).
138
Glazer, supra note 89, at 112 (quoting Brief in Support of Appellees of Amicus Curiae Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual
Assault, Inc., et al. at 4, State v. Bethley, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La.
1996) (no. 96-F0-460)).
139
Bill Rankin et al., Death Still Arbitrary, ATLAnTA JOuRnALCOnSTITuTIOn,
http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/stories/deathpenalty/day
one/dpdayone3.html (last visited nov. 5, 2008); see also Margery
Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Executions By Adopting The
Model Penal Code’s Exclusion Of Death In The Presence Of Lingering Doubt, 21 n. ILL. u. L. ReV. 41, 67 (2001) (“Pro-death jurors may fear that a subsequent jury may not convict, and pro-life
jurors may fear that a subsequent jury will acquit on all charges
or sentence the possibly innocent defendant to death.” (citing
William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors’ Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Pre132
133

Criminal Law Brief

mature Decision Making, 83 CORneLL L. ReV. 1476, 1527
(1998))).
140
Brief of the nACDL, supra note 89, at *2 (citing Johnson v.
Mississippi, 486 u.S. 578, 584 (1988)).
141
Id. at *4.
142
Id.
143
Id. at *6 (stating that a number of studies “have found more
than 20% of children recant their allegations of sexual abuse”)
(citing Malloy et al., supra note 137, at 165).
144
Id. at *2. A number of studies have shown that more than
twenty percent of children recant their allegations of sexual
abuse. Id. (citing Malloy et al., supra note 137, at 165; Kamala
London et al., Children Tell?, 11 PSYCh., PuB. POL’Y. & L. 194,
216 (2005)).
145
Brief of the nACDL, supra note 89, at *3 (citing ex parte
Thompson, 153 S. W. 3d 416, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)
(Cochran, J., concurring)).
146
Daniel e. Monnat & Paige A. nicholas, The Kid Gloves Are
Off: Child Hearsay After Crawford V. Washington, 30 FeB
ChAMPIOn 18, 20 (2006) (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 u.S. 836,
868 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
147
David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child
Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the
Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMInOLOGY 1, 47 (1986) (“With respect to the moral ability to
tell the truth, jurors may believe that children are more likely to
lie than are adults.”).
148
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2675 (2008) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
149
Professor hugo Adam Bedau conceded that some innocent
persons have undoubtedly been executed, “even if it cannot be
proved.” hOOD, supra note 48, at 104 (citing MIChAeL L.
RADeLeT, huGO ADAM BeDAu & COnSTAnCe e. PuTnAM, In SPITe
OF InnOCenCe (1992)).
150
Brief of the nACDL, supra note 89, at *3 (citing herrera v.
Collins, 506 u.S. 390, 407 n.5 (1993)).
151
See generally erik Lillquist, Improving Accuracy in Criminal
Cases, 41 u. RICh. L. ReV. 897, 906-11 (2007); Jerome M. Maiatico, All Eyes on Us: A Comparative Critique of the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, 56 DuKe L.J. 1345 (2007)
(demonstrating the use of safeguards to protect against wrongful
execution).
152
Lillquist, supra note 151, at 908. There is also the possibility
of exonerating a guilty person. Id.
153
See David W. Schaaf, note: What if the Victim is a Child?: Examining the Constitutionality of Louisiana’s Challenge to Coker
v. Georgia, 2000 u. ILL. L. ReV. 347, 375 (2000) (“[I]f
Louisiana’s death-penalty law for child rape is struck down, the
future proliferation of the death penalty could be severely limited.
For the current nonhomicide, nonrape death-penalty laws to survive, states will have to prove that the crime they are punishing
with death is worse than rape.”).
154
State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d at 785 (asserting that child rape is
“the most heinous of all non-homicide crimes,” and remarking
that the united States Supreme Court seems to agree).

* Shirley huang is an associate at the Law Office of Matthew L.
Cersine, P.L.. J.D., 2008, Barry university Dwayne O. Andreas
School of Law, Orlando, Florida; B.A. Psychology and International Relations, 2004, university of California, Davis.

Summer 2009

71

